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We present a number of schemes that use quantum mechanics to preserve privacy, in particular,
we show that entangled quantum states can be useful in maintaining privacy. We further develop our
original proposal [see Phys. Lett. A 349, 75 (2006)] for protecting privacy in voting, and examine
its security under certain types of attacks, in particular dishonest voters and external eavesdroppers.
A variation of these quantum-based schemes can be used for multi-party function evaluation. We
consider functions corresponding to group multiplication of N group elements, with each element
chosen by a different party. We show how quantum mechanics can be useful in maintaining the
privacy of the choices group elements.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many situations in which maintaining the
privacy of information is important. One example is vot-
ing; a voter (let us call him Vincent) does not want either
other voters or the person counting the votes to know
how he voted. Another possible situation is one in which
a number of parties want to pool their financial resources
to purchase, perhaps, a company. They need to find out
if the total amount of money they have is sufficient, but
each individual does not want the others to know how
much he or she has.
Quantum mechanics has proven to be a useful basis
of novel communication schemes. In particular, quan-
tum key distribution uses the laws of physics as the basis
for a scheme to distribute secure cryptographic keys [1].
Here we would like to discuss whether quantum mechan-
ics can be used to protect privacy as well. In particular,
we shall examine the role quantum mechanics can play in
voting schemes and in a special form of distributed func-
tion computation. The elementary primitives for privacy
are the anonymous broadcast channels. An anonymous
one-to-many broadcast channel is one in which each of
the parties can send a message to all of the others, but
only the person who sent the message will know who
sent it, i.e. his identity remains hidden to each receiver.
One solution [2, 3] is based on DC-nets, which solves the
so-called dinning cryptographer’s problem (originally for-
mulated by D.Chaum in Ref. [2]), provided that the com-
munication is secured by a one-time pad. As discussed
in Refs. [4–6] the quantum-based anonymous broadcast
of classical information does not provide us with addi-
tional security beyond that provided by classical pro-
tocols. However, it is possible to anonymously broad-
cast quantum information, in particular, as is shown in
Ref. [4, 5] an unknown state of a quantum system (i.e.
quantum information) can be teleported anonymously, so
that the identity of the sender of the quantum informa-
tion remains hidden.
The paper is structured as follows: In Sec. II we review
the quantum-based voting protocols. In this section and
the following one, we assume that everyone participating
in the protocol is honest but curious, i.e. they follow the
steps of the protocol, but if any extra information comes
their way, they will have a look. In Sec. III, we show how
voting is a special case of a kind of distributed function
evaluation. In Sec. IV, we change the adversary model
and look first at the case of dishonest voters, and then at
the issue of a eavesdropper who wishes to learn how one
of the voters voted. We summarize our results in Sec. V.
A detailed analysis of an attack by a cheating voter can
be found in Appendix.
II. ANONYMOUS VOTING
Let us assume that there are N parties, and they are
each to vote “yes” or“no” on some question. Besides
the voters, there is also an authority (let us call her Al-
ice) who provides the resources for voting and counts the
votes. Throughout the paper, we shall assume that the
authority is honest but curious, that is the authority will
follow the protocol, but if any information is available to
her, she will have a look. Some desirable features that
we might want our voting procedure to satisfy are (for
details see Ref. [7]):
1. Privacy - only the individual voter should know
how he or she voted
2. Security - each voter can vote only once and cannot
change someone else’s vote
3. Verifiability - each voter can make sure that his or
her vote has been counted properly, but simulta-
neously cannot prove to anyone else how he was
voting
4. Eligibility - only eligible voters can vote.
2We shall mainly be discussing the first requirement, but
we shall suggest a method of guaranteeing the second
requirement as well. The analysis of the other two con-
ditions is beyond the scope of the present paper. A con-
siderable effort in classical cryptography has gone into
designing voting systems, but here we shall only consider
quantum based approaches. It is important to say that
the above list of conditions can be extended and there
are different variations of properties the voting should
satisfy. Depending on the specified conditions there ex-
ists unconditionally secure classical protocols, but their
description is beyond the scope of this paper.
There have been two quantum-based voting schemes
proposed independently [8, 9]. The quantum-based vot-
ing scheme proposed by J. Vaccaro, J. Spring, and A.
Chefles [8] makes use of multiparty states whose to-
tal particle number is definite, but the total number of
particles possessed by an individual voter is not fixed.
The votes are encoded in a phase. We shall discuss
here the schemes originally proposed in our earlier pa-
per [9], one of which also encodes votes in a phase, but
in this case each voter has a fixed number of particles. In
what follows we will study in detail two types of voting
schemes: A traveling ballot scheme, and a distributed
ballot scheme. As was mentioned in the Introduction, in
this section we shall assume that everyone is honest but
curious, and we will focus on the privacy condition.
A. Travelling ballot
Let us first consider the traveling ballot scheme. We
shall consider N voters (Vincent.1, Vincent.2 . . . , Vin-
cent.N) and an authority to count the votes. The author-
ity (Alice) begins by preparing the entangled two-qudit
state (D > N)
|Ψ〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
|j〉a|j〉b. (1)
The authority holds the first qudit and sends the second
one to Vincent.1. He now performs one of two operations:
if he wants to vote “yes”, he performs the operation E+,
where E+|j〉 = |j+1〉 (the addition is modulo D), and if
he wants to vote “no” he does nothing (the identity op-
erator). Vincent.1 then passes the qudit on to Vincent.2,
who makes the same choice and sends it further. Finally,
Vincent.N sends the qudit back to Alice (the authority).
The authority’s final two-qudit state is
|Ψm〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
|j〉a|j +m〉b, (2)
where m is the number of “yes” votes. We have that
〈Ψm|Ψm′〉 = δm,m′ , so that if Alice measures the final
state in the basis {|Ψm〉|m = 0, . . . D − 1}, she will be
able to determine the number of “yes” votes. Let us note
a number of things about this scheme.
1) The privacy is guaranteed by the fact that there is “no”
information in the state |Ψm〉 about who voted “yes” and
who voted “no”. In addition, during the entire time the
second qudit is traveling (before it is returned to the au-
thority), the reduced density matrices of all voters and
the authority is ρ = (1/D)I, where I is the identity ma-
trix. That means that during the voting process, neither
the voters nor the authority can determine how the vot-
ing is progressing. In particular, Vincent.2 cannot de-
termine by examining the particle he receives from Vin-
cent.1 how he voted. Therefore, the scheme maintains
the privacy of the voting process.
2) This is stronger security than that provided by a naive
classical scheme. In that scheme, a ballot goes from
voter to voter, and each voter enters into it his vote,
0 for“no”and 1 for “yes”, plus a random number. At the
end the ballot goes back to the authority, and everyone
sends their random number to the authority, who then
subtracts their sum from the total number on the ballot
to arrive at the number of “yes” votes. If the random
numbers remain secret, the scheme insures privacy, but
if the random number of one of the voters, Vincent.2, for
example, becomes known, then the voter who voted just
before, i.e. Vincent.1, and the one who voted just af-
ter him (Vincent.3) can determine Vincent.2’s vote. The
quantum scheme does not require the use of secret infor-
mation, which can become compromised.
A traveling ballot can also be used for, what was called
in Ref. [8], an anonymous survey. This can be used to
compute the average salary of a group of people without
learning the salary of any individual. One uses a trav-
eling ballot, and each person “votes” a number of times
that is proportional to their salary, e.g. one vote means
10, 000 Euros, two means 20, 000 Euros, etc. The author-
ity counts the number of votes and divides by the number
of voters to find the average, but the information about
individual salaries is available neither to the authority
nor to the individual voters.
B. Distributed ballot
For the case of a distributed ballot the framework is
the same, i.e. we shall suppose that there are N voters
and an authority, who counts the votes. The authority
prepares an entangled N -qudit ballot state [9]
|Ψ〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
|j〉⊗N , (3)
where the states {|j〉 |j = 0, . . .D−1} form an orthonor-
mal basis for the D-dimensional space of an individual
qudit, and D > N . A single qudit is now distributed
to each of the voters. In order to vote“no”a voter does
3nothing, and to vote “yes”, he applies the operator
F =
D−1∑
k=0
e2piik/D|k〉〈k|, (4)
to his qudit. Note that at all times during the voting
procedure the reduced density matrix of the qudit of a
single voter is ρ = (1/D)I, so that he can infer nothing
about the votes of the other voters. All of the qudits are
then sent back to the authority, whose state is now (if m
people voted “yes”)
|Ψm〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
e2piijm/D|j〉⊗N . (5)
The states |Ψm〉 are orthogonal for different values of m
and hence can be perfectly distinguished. Consequently,
the authority can determine the number of “yes” votes.
Note that the states |Ψm〉 contain no information about
who voted “yes”; they encode only the total number of
“yes” votes. Again, voter privacy is protected.
An interesting variant on this procedure was proposed
by Dolev, et al. [10]. In their scheme, the ballot state
is locally unitarily equivalent to the state in Eq. (3), the
“yes” vote is described by operation E+ (E+|j〉 = |j+1〉)
and D = N + 1. In particular, the ballot state is
|Φ〉 = 1√
DN−1
∑
l1+···+lN=0 modD
|l1〉 . . . |lN 〉. (6)
We define bn = 0 if the n
th voter voted“no”and bn = 1 if
the nth voter voted “yes”, then the state after the voting
is
|Φ′〉 = 1√
DN−1
∑
l1+...lN=0 modD
|l1+b1〉 . . . |lN+bN〉, (7)
where the addition inside the kets is mod D. Each voter
now measures his qudit in the computational basis get-
ting the outcome xj = lj + bj containing his vote (bj)
and a random number (lj) added to it, but these num-
bers have the property that they add to zero mod D, i.e.∑
j lj = modD. Each voter announces the result of his
measurement and the total sum x =
∑
j(lj+bj) =
∑
j bj
gives the result of the voting. That is, each voter adds
all of the announced results mod D, and the result x is
the total number of “yes” votes.
This scheme can be modified to perform one-to-many
anonymous broadcast, sending logD bits of information.
Consider N parties sharing the state |Φ〉, and let the
sender performs the operation Em+ . This will result in
the new state in which the number l1, l2, . . . lN sum to
m modD. Measuring in the computational basis and
publicly announcing the results will enable each of party
to reconstruct the message m. In a sense this protocol
provides a quantum solution to dining cryptographer’s
problem [2].
III. DISTRIBUTED GROUP MULTIPLICATION
Maintaining privacy on decision making (e.g., voting)
can be considered as a part of a more general task -
multi-party function evaluation. In particular, voting
and an anonymous survey can be viewed as each partici-
pant picking a member of a cyclic group with the object
being to compute the sum of all of the chosen members
and doing so in such a way that the participants’ choices
are not revealed. We would like to show that a similar
procedure works for computing the product of group ele-
ments chosen by the participants for any group. That is,
voting is just a special case of distributed group multi-
plication. Throughout this section we shall assume that
everyone is honest but curious.
This problem is related to that of secure function eval-
uation. Suppose that Donna has a device that will eval-
uate the function f(x, y, z). Alice, who has the input
x, Bob, who has the input y, and Charlie, who has in-
put z, would like to know the value of f(x, y, z), but
each of them wants Donna and the other two partici-
pants to know as little about their input as possible. In
fact, ideally Donna would know only as much as she can
infer from knowing the value of f(x, y, z), and each of
the other parties would only know as much as they could
infer from knowing f(x, y, z) and their own input. Note
that voting is a special case of this problem in which the
variables take only the values 0 and 1, and the function
is addition.
Can something like this be accomplished using
quantum-based methods? This problem was analyzed
by H.-K. Lo for the case of two parties (Alice and Bob),
and he showed that in the case of two-party secure com-
putations it cannot [13]. In the two-party case Alice eval-
uates the function, and she has one input and Bob has
the other. In one-sided secure function evaluation only
Alice learns f(x, y) and in two-sided secure computation
both learn f(x, y). In both cases Alice and Bob are to
learn as little about each other’s input as possible. Lo
showed that one-sided two-party quantum secure compu-
tation is, in fact, always insecure, that there are functions
for which the two-sided scenario is also insecure.
We would like to start by showing that a modification
of our traveling ballot scheme will allow us to accomplish
the task described in the first paragraph of this section for
a particular function, group multiplication in the Klein
4-group, and for participants who are curious but follow
the protocol. This is an order four abelian group whose
elements we shall denote by {e, x1, x2, x3}. The element
e is the identity, x2j = e, and xjxk = xl, where j,k, and
l are all different. Alice, Bob and Charlie each choose
a group element, and they want to know the product of
the three elements. Donna prepares the two-qubit state
|Ψ〉 = (|0〉|1〉− |1〉|0〉)/√2, keeps one qubit and sends the
other to Alice. Based on her choice of a group element,
Alice then applies an operation to the qubit using the
4correspondence
e→ I x1 → σx
x2 → σy x3 → σz , (8)
where I is the identity, and σx, σy, and σz are the Pauli
matrices. She then sends the qubit on to Bob, who ap-
plies an operation to the qubit based on his choice of
group element (using the same correspondence between
operations and group elements), and he then sends it on
to Charlie who does the same. Finally, Charlie sends
the particle back to Donna. Donna measures the result-
ing state in the Bell basis, and from this measurement
she can determine which of the four states she has, |Ψ〉,
(I ⊗ σx)|Ψ〉, (I ⊗ σy)|Ψ〉, or (I ⊗ σz)|Ψ〉 (each of these
states is proportional to an element of the Bell basis).
Using the correspondence between group elements and
operations she can tell what the product of the group
operations was. For example, if she found that she had
(I ⊗ σx)|Ψ〉, then she would know the product was x1.
This procedure is a variant of dense coding [14]. It is
based on the fact that the operators {I, σx, σy , σz} form
a projective representation of the Klein 4-group. Note
that during the entire procedure the reduced density ma-
trix of each of the participants is ρ = I/2, so they are
able to learn nothing about what the other participants
have done. The final state received by Donna contains
no information about who did what, it only contains in-
formation about the product of their choices of group
elements.
This scheme can be generalized to any finite group and
arbitrary number of participants. Let G be a group, and
g ∈ G→ U(g), where U(g) is aD×D unitary matrix, and
the matrices U(g) form a D-dimensional representation
of G. Donna starts with the two-qudit state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
|j〉|j〉. (9)
The second qudit is sent to Alice, who acts on it with
U(ga), where ga ∈ G is her input, and then sends the
qudit on to Bob. Bob applies the operation U(gb), where
gb ∈ G is his input, and sends the qudit on to Charlie,
who does the same, etc. At the end of the procedure
Norbert sends the qudit back to Donna who has the two-
qudit state I ⊗ U(gp)|Ψ〉, where gp = gagb . . . gn is the
product of the group elements chosen by the parties who
are providing the inputs. A requirement is that these
states are orthogonal for different group element, gp, so
that Donna can distinguish them. This requires that
〈Ψ|I ⊗ U(g−12 g1)|Ψ〉 = 0 (10)
for any two g1, g2 ∈ G, such that g1 6= g2. This con-
dition will be fulfilled if Tr(U(g)) = 0 for any group el-
ement not equal to the identity. This condition is sat-
isfied by the regular representation of any group. For
this representation, which is, in general, reducible, the
dimension is equal to the order of the group. In order to
give an explicit description of the matrices U(g) in this
representation, we order the group elements, gj , where
j = 0, . . . |G|− 1. The matrix elements of U(gn) are then
given by
U(gn)jk =
{
1 if g−1j gk = gn
0 otherwise
. (11)
It may be possible to find representations of smaller di-
mension that satisfy the condition, Tr(U(g)) = 0 for any
group element not equal to the identity, but we are at
least assured that if we choose the dimension equal to
the order of the group, such a representation exists.
Note that if we used the regular representation in the
case of the Klein 4-group, our representation would have
had dimension four, but we were able to find one that
has dimension two. The two-dimensional representation
is, in fact, a projective representation. A projective rep-
resentation of a group is a mapping from the group to
unitary matrices, g → U(g), that satisfies
U(g1)U(g2) = e
iω(g1,g2)U(g1g2), (12)
where ω(g1, g2) is a real-valued function on G × G. A
projective representation that satisfies Tr(U(g)) = 0 for
any group element not equal to the identity will also pro-
duce states I⊗U(gp)|Ψ〉 that are mutually orthogonal. In
some cases, the use of a projective representation will al-
low one to achieve this result with a smaller dimensional
space than would be possible if one restricted oneself to
standard representations.
For abelian groups it is also possible to use a dis-
tributed ballot scheme. This is because any abelian group
is isomorphic to a direct product of cyclic groups. We
distribute one particle for each cyclic group appearing in
the decomposition of the abelian group, and the parties
apply operators, similar to the voting operators in the
previous section, to each particle to encode their group
element. At the end of the procedure, all of the parti-
cles are returned to Donna, who can then determine the
product of the group elements.
Let’s illustrate this procedure with a simple example.
We again consider the Klein 4-group and the parties Al-
ice, Bob, and Charlie, who are to choose group elements.
The Klein 4-group is isomorphic to Z2 × Z2, whose el-
ements can be expressed as {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
The following state is prepared
|Ψ〉 = 1
2

 1∑
j=0
|j〉⊗3

⊗
(
1∑
k=0
|k〉⊗3
)
, (13)
and one qubit from the first triple and one from the sec-
ond is distributed to each of the three parties. Each party
now chooses a group element and performs an operation
on his or her pair of qubits according to the correspon-
dence
(0, 0)→ I ⊗ I (1, 0)→ σz ⊗ I
(0, 1)→ I ⊗ σz (1, 1)→ σz ⊗ σz . (14)
5All of the qubits are then sent to Donna. She measures
each triple in the basis
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉|0〉 ± |1〉|1〉|1〉), (15)
with a |φ+〉 result corresponding to a 0 and a |φ−〉 re-
sult corresponding to a 1. For example, if she obtained
|φ+〉 for the first triple and |φ−〉 for the second, this cor-
responds to the group element (0, 1). Therefore, she is
able to determine the product of the group elements cho-
sen by Alice, Bob, and Charlie without knowing their
individual choices.
IV. DISHONEST VOTERS AND
EAVESDROPPERS
We now want to change the rules. So far, we have been
assuming that everyone was honest but curious. Now we
want to relax that constraint. First, we will look at the
case of dishonest voters. These voters want to vote more
than once. We shall present a scheme that prevents them
from doing that. Another possibility is that all of the
participants in the voting scheme are honest, but there
is an eavesdropper who wants to discover how one or
more of the voters voted. We shall now explore these
two scenarios.
A. Dishonest voters
One problem with the voting schemes presented so far
is that there is nothing to prevent voters from voting
more than once. If they want to vote “yes” more than
once they simply apply the operator corresponding to a
“yes” vote more than once, if they want to increase the
number of“no”votes they apply the inverse of the “yes”
operator. One possible way of dealing with this problem
was suggested in Ref. [9]. In this section we will discuss
variations of the distributed-ballot and traveling-ballot
that deal with this problem.
We begin with the distributed-ballot scheme. The bal-
lot state is the same as in the Eq. (3). In addition, the au-
thority distributes to each voter two voting states, which
are single qudits. The voting qudit corresponding to a
“yes” vote is in the state |ψ(θy)〉 and the qudit corre-
sponding to a“no”vote is in the state |ψ(θn)〉, where
|ψ(θ)〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eijθ |j〉, (16)
and the angles θy and θn are given by θy = (2pily/D)+ δ
and θn = (2piln/D) + δ. The integers ly and ln and the
number 0 ≤ δ < 2pi/D are known only to the authority.
The voter chooses the voting particle corresponding to
his vote, and using a process much like teleportation, is
able to transfer the state of the voting qudit onto his
ballot qudit. Because Alice knows ly, ln, and δ she can
determine the number of “yes” votes. If a voter tries to
cheat and measure the values of θy and θn, he can only
measure them to an accuracy of order 2pi/D. If he uses
these measured values to vote, he will introduce errors.
These errors will show up if the voting is repeated several
times. If no cheating occurred, then the result will be the
same each time. If cheating did occur, then the results
will fluctuate. Therefore, the authority would be able to
tell if someone is cheating. In order to facilitate voting
several times, the authority can distribute several ballot
states to the voters at the beginning of the voting process
and instruct them to vote the same way on each one. Let
us now examine this procedure in more detail:
Step 0: Distribution of states
Alice distributes the entangled ballot state |Ψ〉 described
in Eq.(3) and sends to each voter two additional qudits
|ψ(θy)〉 and |ψ(θn)〉. First, we assume that (ly − ln)N <
D, where, as before, N is the number of voters (Vin-
cent.1, . . . , Vincent.N). This condition is necessary in
order that different voting results be distinguishable. As
previously mentioned, the integers ly and ln and the an-
gle δ are not known to the voters.
Step 1: Voting process
Depending on his choice the voter (Vincent.X) combines
either |ψ(θy)〉, or |ψ(θn)〉, with the original ballot parti-
cle, i.e. creates a system composed from the ballot and
the voting qudits. Then he performs a two-qudit mea-
surement of the observable R =
∑D−1
r=0 rPr , where
Pr =
D−1∑
j=0
|j + r〉b〈j + r| ⊗ |j〉v〈j|, (17)
and the subscript b denotes the ballot qudit while the
subscript v denotes the voting qudit. Registering the
outcome r the voter applies the operation Vr = Ib ⊗∑D−1
j=0 |j + r〉v〈j| to the voting qudit. If the voter voted
“yes”, the state of the ballot and voting state is then (up
to normalization)
VrPr|Ψ〉|ψ(θy)〉 = 1
D
(
r−1∑
k=0
ei(D+k−r)θy |k〉⊗(N+1)
+
D−1∑
k=r
ei(k−r)θy |k〉⊗(N+1)
)
. (18)
It is necessary to get rid of the factor exp(iDθy) = e
iDδ in
the first term. After a voter has voted, he tells (publicly)
the authority the value of r he obtained, because only the
authority has knowledge of δ and can undo this factor.
Each voter sends both (the ballot and the voting) qudits
back to the authority. The remaining unused qudit must
be kept, or destroyed in order to secure the privacy of
the registered vote.
Step 2: Reading the result
When the ballot state is returned to the authority, she
6applies an operator
W =
N∏
k=1
Wrk (19)
to one of the particles in the ballot state [15]. The integer
rk is the value of r obtained by the k
th voter, where
Wr|k〉 =
{
e−iDδ|k〉 0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1
|k〉 r ≤ k ≤ D − 1 . (20)
That removes the unwanted phase factors. The authority
is then in possession of a state consisting of 2N qudits.
If my = m voters voted “yes”, mn = N −m voters voted
“no”, the authority, after the application of the operator
W , now has the state
|Ω′m〉 =
1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eij(myθy+mnθn)|j〉⊗2N , (21)
where an irrelevant global phase factor has been dropped.
The phase factor appearing in the sum can be expressed
as
eij(myθy+mnθn) = eijm∆eijNθn , (22)
where ∆ = θy − θn = 2pi(ly − ln)/D. The factor eijNθn
can be removed by the authority by applying a unitary
transformation that shifts |j〉 to e−ijNθn |j〉 to one of the
qudits. This finally leaves the authority with the state
|Ωq〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
e2piijq/D |j〉⊗2N , (23)
where q = m(ly − ln). These states are orthogonal for
different values of q, for q an integer between 0 and D−1
(we need to choose |ly − ln| and D to guarantee that q
is in this range), so we see that from the state |Ωq〉 the
authority can determine the value of q corresponding to
this state. This allows her to determine m, because she
knows both ly and ln. Note that q should always be a
multiple of ly − ln if the voters are using their proper
ballot states. If after measuring the ballot state, the
authority finds a value of q that is not a multiple of ly−ln,
then she knows that someone has cheated. Let us note
that the total measurement is described by projective
operations Mq = |Ωq〉〈Ωq|, for 0 ≤ q ≤ D − 1 and a
multiple of ly − ln, and Merror = I −
∑
qMq.
A similar procedure works for a traveling-ballot
scheme. In this case, the previous traveling-ballot scheme
is modified so that votes are recored by means of a ro-
tation rather than as a shift. We start with the ballot
state in Eq. (1), and as in the distributed-scheme vot-
ing particles in the states |ψ(θy)〉 and |ψ(θn)〉 are dis-
tributed to the voters. We still have θy = (2pily/D) + δ
and θn = (2piln/D)+ δ. A voter now combines the ballot
state with the voting particle representing his choice and
measures R as before. Suppose he wants to vote “yes”
and the result r is obtained upon measuring R. The state
is then
Pr|Ψ〉|ψ(θy)〉 = 1
D

r−1∑
j=0
ei(D+j−r)θy |j〉a|j〉b|j − r +D〉v
+
D−1∑
j=r
ei(j−r)θy |j〉a|j〉b|j − r〉v

 . (24)
The voter now tells the authority the value of r, and the
authority applies the operator Wr to the particle in her
possession. This removes the unwanted factor of eiDθy in
the first term. The voter now applies the operator Ur to
the ballot and voting particle, where
Ur|j〉b|j + r −D〉v = |j〉b|0〉v, (25)
for 0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1, and
Ur|j〉b|j − r〉v = |j〉b|0〉v, (26)
for r ≤ j ≤ D − 1. This has the effect of disentangling
the voting particle from the rest of the state,
UrWrPr|Ψ〉|ψ(θy)〉 = 1D
(∑r−1
j=0 e
i(j−r)θy |j〉a|j〉b
+
∑D−1
j=r e
i(j−r)θy |j〉a|j〉b
)
|0〉v.(27)
The ballot particle is now passed on to the next voter,
who repeats the procedure. At the end of the voting, the
ballot particle is returned to the authority, who then has
the state
|Ω′′m〉 =
1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eij(myθy+mnθn)|j〉a|j〉b, (28)
up to a global phase factor. From there on the analysis
is the same as in the distributed ballot case.
As we discussed at the beginning of this subsection a
voter who wants to vote more than once is faced with
the problem of determining what θy or θn are, and this
cannot be done from just a single state. However, there
is a small chance that the cheating won’t be detected and
therefore, the voting has to be performed several times.
However, just a single difference in outcomes means that
someone is cheating. The details of an attack by a cheater
and its consequences are described in Appendix.
B. Eavesdropper
Now we shall consider an attack by an external eaves-
dropper, who wants to learn how one of the participants
voted. The actual participants in the protocol are as-
sumed to be honest but curious.
First, let us consider the traveling-ballot scheme. Sup-
pose an eavesdropper, Eve wants to know how the second
voter, Vincent.2, voted. She intercepts the ballot qudit
7just before it is due to be received by Vincent.2 and sends
it on to Vincent.3. To Vincent.2 she sends her own qu-
dit, which is in the state |0〉. After Vincent.2 votes, she
intercepts the qudit and measures it; if it is in the state
|0〉, Vincent.2 voted “no”, if it is in the state |1〉, then
Vincent.2 voted “yes”. This type of attack seems to be
very hard to prevent. One possibility, which is very ex-
pensive in terms or resources, is to use teleportation. If
successive voters share entangled two qudit states of the
form given in Eq. (1), they can then teleport the ballot
state to each other rather than physically send the ballot
particle. This procedure would prevent the of man-in-
the-middle attack just described, but requires that the
participants originally shared many qudit pairs and used
entanglement purification to bring any correlations with
outside systems, such as those possessed by an eavesdrop-
per, to acceptable levels. Therefore, this approach is not
a particularly desirable one.
A distributed-ballot scheme seems to offer more pos-
sibilities. In order to illustrate this, we shall compare
the vulnerability of a classical and a quantum scheme to
eavesdropping. We shall consider the case in which there
is an eavesdropper, Eve, who wants to find out how Vin-
cent.1 voted.
Our classical scheme is a variant of one proposed in
the paper by Dolev et al. [10]. There are two authorities,
one who generates ballots and one who counts the votes,
and there are N voters. The first authority generates N
ballots, one for each voter, and on each ballot an integer
between 0 and N is written. These numbers have the
property that their sum is equal to zero modulo N + 1.
When each voter receives his ballot, he does nothing to
vote “no” and adds 1 to vote “yes.” The ballots are all
sent to the second authority, who simply adds all of the
numbers modulo N+1, with the result being the number
of “yes” votes.
The second authority does not know how any of the
individual voters voted, because she does not know the
original integers written on the ballots. If fact, she has
no information about how the voters voted, if each set of
ballots (that is, each sequence of N integers whose sum
is zero modulo N+1) is equally likely. We can see this as
follows. We can represent the initial state of the ballots
by a sequence of N integers, each of which is between 0
andN and whose sum is zero moduloN+1. Similarly, we
can represent the final state (after voting) of the ballots
by a sequence of N integers, each of which is between 0
and N and whose sum ism modulo N+1, wherem is the
number of “yes” votes. The set of voters who voted “yes”
can be represented by a sequence of ones and zeroes, ones
denoting the voters who voted “yes,” of length N . Now
for each sequence of N integers whose sum is equal to
m mod N + 1, and each sequence of length N consisting
of m ones and N − m zeroes, there is a sequence of N
integers whose sum is 0 mod N + 1( found simply by
subtracting the second sequence from the first). Thus
with no knowledge of the initial ballot set, all we can
conclude from a final ballot set whose numbers sum to
m mod N +1, is that some subset consisting of m voters
voted “yes.” Therefore, the voting information, that is,
who voted how, is protected from the curiosity of the
authorities.
Now let us add the eavesdropper. Eve wants to know
how voter number 1 (Vincent 1) voted, and she has an
excellent method of doing so. She intercepts the ballot
going to Vincent 1, records the number on it, and sends
the ballot on to him. Vincent 1 votes, and Eve again
intercepts the ballot, notes the result, and sends it on
to the second authority. Eve now knows how Vincent 1
voted, and her intervention has not been detected.
Next let us consider the quantum scheme. The ballot
state is the N qudit state given by Eq. (3). We shall
assume that the same authority prepares the ballot state
and later measures it to count the votes. As before, a
qudit from the ballot state is sent to each voter, and if
they wish to vote “no,” they do nothing, and if they wish
to vote “yes,” they apply the operator F .
Let us now suppose that Eve wants to determine how
Vincent 1 voted and not be detected. One way of doing
this is the following. Eve intercepts ballot particle 1 on
its way to Vincent 1 and entangles it with an ancilla. In
particular, suppose the ancilla is a qudit initially in the
state
|ψ〉E = 1√
D
D−1∑
k=0
|k〉E , (29)
and the entangling operation is the swap operator,
Uswap|k〉E ⊗ |j〉1 = |j〉E ⊗ |k〉1. After this is done, the
ballot plus ancilla state is
|Ψ′〉 = 1
D
D−1∑
k=0
D−1∑
j=0
|j〉E |k〉1|j〉⊗(N−1). (30)
After the voting, the state becomes
|Ψ′′〉 = 1
D
D−1∑
k=0
D−1∑
j=0
e2piim1k/De2piimj/D|j〉E |k〉1|j〉⊗(N−1),
(31)
wherem1 = 0, 1 is the vote of Vincent 1 andm is the sum
of the rest of the votes. Now, Eve again intercepts ballot
particle number 1 on its way to the authority and again
applies the swap operator to particle 1 and the ancilla.
The state of the system is now
|Ψ′′′〉 = 1
D
(
D−1∑
k=0
e2piim1k/D|k〉E
)
D−1∑
j=0
e2piimj/D|j〉1|j〉⊗(N−1).
(32)
Now Eve can measure the ancilla particle to determine
m1. Once she has done so, she applies the appropriate
operator to particle 1, nothing ifm1 = 0 and F ifm1 = 1,
and sends the particle to the authority. At this point she
knows how Vincent 1 voted, and her presence has not
been detected.
8So far, the quantum scheme seems just as vulnerable
as the classical one. We can defend against the kind of
attack discussed above by adding an additional element.
Before the voting occurs, the voters are divided up into
pairs. Who is in which pair is not public knowledge.
This can be accomplished if the authority and voters
share a secure key. This would allow the authority to
tell each voter with whom they are paired in a secure
fashion. The voters in each pair must come together,
perhaps at a polling place, where they can perform a
joint measurement on their ballot particles. If there has
been no tampering, these measurements do not change
the state of the system, and the voting proceeds as usual.
If the measurements detect tampering the procedure is
aborted. One could group the voters into larger sets and
perform correspondingly larger collective measurements.
Pairs minimizes the complexity of the collective measure-
ments, and it means that each voter has to meet with only
one other voter to perform the collective measurement.
It is important that Eve not know which voters have been
assigned to the pairs. If she did, she could perform an
attack using swap operators on a pair, which is very sim-
ilar to the attack discussed above, and learn how the pair
voted. Using this attack, she would, however, not learn
how an individual voted.
Having the some of the voters come together is awk-
ward, but for the type of check we are discussing it seems
to be necessary. The basic idea is that if Eve wants to
determine how an individual, or set of individuals, voted,
she has to break the symmetry of the ballot state. In or-
der to detect this, the voters have to test the symmetry
of the ballot state, and this seems to require a collective
measurement. An alternative would be to use teleporta-
tion, and have one member of a pair teleport the state of
the ballot particle to the other member of the pair, who
could then perform the collective measurement and tele-
port the particle back if the measurement was successful.
This would be, however, very expensive in terms of the
number of entangled pairs required.
In order to examine this type or eavesdropping attack
in detail, let us suppose that one of the pairs consists
of voters 1 and 2. When they receive their ballot parti-
cles, they perform the measurement corresponding to the
projection operator
P12 =
D−1∑
j=0
|j〉1〈j| ⊗ |j〉2〈j|. (33)
If they get 1, they proceed to voting, if they get 0, they
abort the procedure.
Now suppose that an eavesdropper, who wants to find
out how voter 1 votes, has intercepted the ballot particle
destined for voter 1 and entangled it with an ancilla in her
possession, and then sent the ballot state on to voter 1.
We assume that the entanglement has been accomplished
by means of a unitary operator UE1(|0〉E⊗|j〉1) = |φj〉E1.
The state of the N voters plus the ancilla is now
|Ψ′〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
|φj〉E1 ⊗ |j〉⊗(N−1). (34)
Eve’s plan is to measure the ancilla after the voting has
occurred to gain information about how voter 1 voted.
The probability of not detecting the eavesdropping is just
〈Ψ′|P12|Ψ′〉, which can be expressed as
〈Ψ′|P12|Ψ′〉 = 1
D
D−1∑
j=0
E1〈φj |(IE ⊗ |j〉1〈j|)|φj〉E1, (35)
where IE is the identity on the ancilla space. Eve would
like this quantity to be equal to 1, i.e. she does not
want to be detected. For that to be true, we must have
|φj〉E1 = |ηj〉E ⊗ |j〉1 for some ancilla states |ηj〉. If this
is the case, the state after the voting has taken place is
|Ψ′′〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
e2piimj/D|ηj〉E ⊗ |j〉⊗N , (36)
if m voters voted “yes.” Tracing out all of the voters
except for voter 1, we find that the density matrix for
voter 1 and the ancilla state is
ρE1 =
1
D
D−1∑
j=0
|ηj〉E〈ηj | ⊗ |j〉1〈j|, (37)
which contains no information about the votes. That
means that even if Eve intercepts ballot particle 1 after
the vote and performs an entangling operation on it and
the ancilla, she will learn nothing about the vote. So, if
the eavesdropper is undetectable, she gains no informa-
tion about the voting, and if she gains information about
the voting, she can be detected.
Note that even in the general case when |φj〉E1 is not
a product state, if voters 1 and 2 obtained one when they
measured P12, then it will be after the measurement.
This follows from the fact that (IE ⊗ |j〉1〈j|)|φj〉E1 =
|µj〉E⊗|j〉1, where |µj〉E is an unnormalized ancilla state.
Then the density matrix for the ancilla and particle 1
will look the same as in Eq. (37) except that |ηj〉 will be
replaced by |µj〉E , and there will be an overall normal-
ization factor. It still does not contain any information
on the voting.
Finally, let us find the probability of Eve being de-
tected in the scheme that made use of the swap operator.
A short calculation shows that the probability of Eve not
being detected is
〈Ψ′|P12|Ψ′〉 = 1
D
, (38)
so that the probability of her being detected is 1−(1/D).
Therefore, it is quite likely that this type of tampering
by Eve will be detected.
9V. CONCLUSION
We have shown how quantum mechanics can be of use
in maintaining privacy in tasks such as anonymous vot-
ing and in a special case of multi-party function evalua-
tion. The voting scheme we described was introduced in
Ref. [9]. In this paper we provide a more detailed discus-
sion of that scheme, including a more detailed analysis
of some aspects of its security.
The schemes presented here need much more exami-
nation in order to determine how secure they are under
different kinds of cheating and eavesdropping attacks. It
could be the case that quantum resources themselves will
not provide us with any additional feature that will result
in more effective and secure anonymous voting protocol.
However, it is useful to think about how quantum re-
sources can be applied to such complex problem. Such
efforts can bring results that can potentially enhance pri-
vacy in less complex cryptographic tasks. We hope that
what has been presented here will provide a framework
for thinking about these issues.
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Appendix A: Cheating by multiple votes
Let us look at cheating in more detail. We shall as-
sume that one of the voters, whom we shall call Vin-
cent.X, is dishonest, and that he wants to vote “no”,
and in addition he wants to replace “yes” votes with
“no” votes. He employs a measurement to determine
θy and θn, which is described by the POVM operators
E(θ) = (D/2pi)|Φ(θ)〉〈Φ(θ)|, where
|Φ(θ)〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eijθ|j〉.
This is a phase estimation measurement, and the prob-
ability distribution for the measurement result θ in the
state |ψ〉 is p(θ) = 〈ψ|E(θ)|ψ〉. If Vincent.X obtains the
values θ′y and θ
′
n from his measurements of the voting
particles, the probability distributions for these results
are
py(θ
′
y) = 〈ψ(θy)|E(θ′y)|ψ(θy)〉 =
1
2piD
∣∣∣∣∣∣
D−1∑
j=0
eij(θ
′
y−θy)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
;
pn(θ
′
n) = 〈ψ(θn)|E(θ′n)|ψ(θn)〉 =
1
2piD
∣∣∣∣∣∣
D−1∑
j=0
eij(θ
′
n−θn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
Note that these functions are peaked about the values
θy and θn, respectively. In order to vote“no” Vincent.X
prepares a particle in the state |ψ(θ′n)〉 and carries out
the usual voting procedure with it. He then applies the
operator
U(θ′y, θ
′
n) =
D−1∑
k=0
eik(θ
′
n−θ
′
y)|k〉〈k|,
to his ballot qudit s times, which has the effect of remov-
ing s “yes” votes and adding s“no”votes. He then sends
his ballot and voting qudits back to the authority.
We want to see how Vincent.X’s cheating affects the
measurement the authority makes to determine the num-
ber of “yes” votes. We shall assume, for the sake of sim-
plicity, that Vincent.X is the last person to vote, and that
my of the previous voters voted “yes”, and mn voted no,
where my +mn = N − 1. The order in which the voters
vote makes no difference to the final result, so this as-
sumption is made for the sake of notational convenience.
In addition, we shall also assume that the other voters
have reported their results frommeasuring the observable
R, and that the necessary corrections have been applied.
This means that the state of the ballot and voting parti-
cles just before it reaches Vincent.X is
|Ξ1〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eij(myθy+mnθn)|j〉⊗(2N−1).
As stated in the previous paragraph, Vincent.X now pre-
pares a qudit in the state |ψ(θ′n)〉 and applies the usual
voting procedure. Let us suppose that when he measures
the observable R he obtains the value r. After he ap-
plies U(θ′y, θ
′
n) s times the state of the ballot and voting
particles is
|Ξ2〉 = 1√
D
r−1∑
j=0
ei(D+j−r)θ
′
neisj(θ
′
n−θ
′
y)eij(myθy+mnθn)|j〉⊗2N + 1√
D
D−1∑
j=r
ei(j−r)θ
′
neisj(θ
′
n−θ
′
y)eij(myθy+mnθn)|j〉⊗2N .
This is the state possessed by the authority (Alice) after the ballot and voting particles have been returned to her.
Alice now uses Vincent.X’s measurement result, r, to correct the state. After having done so, and after removing
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unimportant phase factors, the authority has the state
|Ξ3〉 = 1√
D
eiD(θ
′
n−δ)
r−1∑
j=0
eij[s(θ
′
n−θ
′
y)+m∆+θ
′
n−θn]|j〉⊗2N + 1√
D
D−1∑
j=r
eij[s(θ
′
n−θ
′
y)+m∆+θ
′
n−θn]|j〉⊗2N ,
where ∆ = θy − θn and we have set m = my.
Alice now measures the state |Ξ3〉 in the |Ωq〉 basis [see Eq. (23)] in order to determine the number of “yes” votes.
If there were no cheating she would find q = m with certainty. With cheating, however, this is no longer the case, and
this is what tells Alice that cheating has taken place. The voting is repeated several times, and if she finds different
values of q, then she knows cheating has taken place. In order to find the probability distribution for q assuming that
Vincent.X measured r for the observable R and that m people voted “yes”, which we shall denote by p(q|r,m)), we
first note that the probability that the authority finds the value q given that Vincent.X measured the values θ′y, θ
′
n,
and r, and that m people voted “yes” is given by
p(q|r,m, θ′y, θ′n) = |〈Ωq|Ξ3〉|2 =
1
D2
∣∣∣∣∣∣eiD(θ
′
n−δ)
r−1∑
j=0
eij[s(θ
′
n−θ
′
y)+θ
′
n+φ] +
D−1∑
j=r
eij[s(θ
′
n−θ
′
y)+θ
′
n+φ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
where φ = m∆− θn − (2piq/D). We then have that
p(q|r,m) =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ′y
∫ 2pi
0
dθ′np(q|r,m, θ′y, θ′n)py(θ′y)pn(θ′n).
Let us consider a particular case in which D = N + 1, ly = 1, ln = 0, and s > D/2. This choice of s is one that
Vincent.X might make if he thought that that there will be a majority of “yes” votes, and he wants to make sure that
the measure being voted upon loses. One then finds that
p(q|r,m) = 1
D
{
1 +
2(D − s)[(D − 2)(D − s− 1) + (s+ 1)]
D3
cos[2pi(m− s− q)/D]
}
.
Note that while this distribution has a maximum at q =
m − s, which is the result Vincent.X desires, it is very
broad. That means that when the authority measures q
several times she will find a spread of values, showing her
that someone is cheating.
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